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Student Comments
"Secular Humanism": A Blight on the
Establishment Clause
I.

INTRODUCTION

A new complication has beset establishment clause jurisprudence.' Some Christians find in the Supreme Court's "wall of separation between church and state" 2 a hostility toward religion they
believe the first amendment should not permit.3 They argue that
the exclusion of traditional religion from government amounts to
an unconstitutional establishment of a secular4 religion, variously
referred to as secularism, atheism or, most popularly, secular humanism.5 To these disaffected Christians, secular humanism refers
to a philosophy that "replaces a worship of the transcendent or
supernatural deity with the deification of man and humankind." 6
Several claims based on these arguments have made their way
1. The first amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that "Congress shall
make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first part of this clause is referred to as the establishment clause, and the latter part, the free exercise clause. These restrictions are applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
2. See infra note 9.
3. See generally Horn, Secularism and Pluralismin Public Education, 7 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 177 (1984) (discussing the "secularist bias" of strict separationism); Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism and Its First
Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 (1978) (attacking the progressive
secularization of government).
4. The word "secular" commonly means "of or relating to the worldly or temporal as
distinguished from the spiritual or eternal ... not sacred ... not overtly or specif[ically]
religious ... of or relating to the state as distinguished from the church." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2053 (1961).
5. See Rhode Island Fed'n of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 850, 853-54
(1st Cir. 1980) (denial of tax deduction for parochial school expenses does not establish
secular humanism). See generally C. RICE, BEYOND ABORTION: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF THE SECULAR STATE (1979); McGarry, The Unconstitutionalityof Exclusive Governmental Support of Entirely Secularistic Education, 28 CATHOLIC LAWYER 1
(1983); Commentary, Secularism in the Law. The Religion of Secular Humanism, 8
OHIO N.U.L. REV. 329 (1981); Note, The Myth of Religious Neutrality by Separation in
Education, 71 VA. L. REV. 127, 127-128 (1985).
6. Commentary, supra note 5, at 350. Accord Whitehead and Conlan, supra note 3, at
34-36 (secular humanism is man-centered, not God-centered). Secular humanism looks
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into the courts. After describing these claims and how the courts
have responded to them, this comment will discuss the analytical
problems involved in treating secular matters as religious within
the context of the establishment clause. It will urge courts to recognize the inconsistencies in an establishment of the secular, and to
reevaluate present concepts of neutrality and hostility toward religion which unnecessarily complicate establishment clause
jurisprudence.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

How Much Separation?

The Judeo-Christian civilization of western Europe has informed
our political institutions. During much of the long history of that
civilization, church and state were closely identified. 7 This nation,
in contrast, espouses religious freedom. The first amendment to
the United States Constitution guarantees that freedom-on the
one hand by ensuring that the state does not adopt an official religion or impose religion on anyone, via the establishment clause;
and on the other hand by interfering as little as possible with religious practice and belief, via the free exercise clause.8
The Supreme Court has declared that the establishment clause
erects a "wall of separation between church and state." 9 Exactly
to reason and science rather than divine guidance for the solution of moral, social and
political questions. Id.
Christians have borrowed the term secular humanism from a movement whose philosophy is set out in the "Humanist Manifesto." See C. RICE, supra note 5, at 33; Whitehead
& Conlan, supra note 3, at 31-46. Usually, though, they use secular humanism to refer to
particular ideas and not to self-proclaimed Secular Humanists. This comment does not
attempt to define secular humanism precisely. Rather, the comment uses the term as it is
used popularly, without regard for whether that usage is appropriate. References, in a
few instances, to Secular Humanists (capitalized) indicate members of the organized
group by that name.
Opponents of secular humanism also complain of secularization-the removal of religion-or secularism-a preference for the secular. For explanations of secular humanism
by its critics, see C. RICE, supra note 5; Taylor, The Christian and Secular Humanism,
1982 J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 219, 222-28 (1982); Whitehead & Conlan, supra
note 3, at 29-61.
7. See A.C.L.U. v. City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561, 1563 (6th Cir. 1986). The
close alignment of church and state produced an oppressiveness that led many of the
earliest European Americans to this continent. For a description of how the religion
clauses of the first amendment grew out of experiences of religious oppression, see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-14 (1947).
8. See supra note 1.
9. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). The Supreme Court has given
the following interpretation to the establishment clause:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can

1987]

Secular Humanism

1247

what separation implies, however, has never been clear." In the
last several decades, the Court has defined separation in ways that
have surprised and angered many Christians. "
In two controversial decisions of the late 1940s, the Supreme
Court held that the establishment clause goes beyond merely
prohibiting the state from adopting an official religion. In Everson
v. Board of Education,12 the Court first outlined the broad scope of
the establishment clause: government may not pass laws to aid
religion, force religion on anyone, or use tax monies to support
religious institutions. 13 Though upholding a statute that reimbursed parents for the cost of transporting children to religious
schools,' 4 Everson defined establishment to preclude direct government aid to religion. ' 5 The next year, the Court applied this principle by holding unconstitutional a public school program that
allowed students to attend religion classes on school grounds during the day. 16
Public reaction to those decisions was heated.' 7 Some religious
groups and constitutional scholars called for a narrow interpretation of the establishment clause that would limit its scope to the
prohibition of an official state religion, and allow the impartial support of all religions.' 8 But in the 1960s, the Supreme Court reafpass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion ....
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and
state."
Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164).
10. See A.C.L.U. v. City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d at 1563.
11. Though Christian groups are in the forefront of the opposition to strict separation, not all Christians are like-minded. Some Christian groups have actively supported
separation of church and state. For example, though Protestants historically formed the
primary support for Bible reading in the public schools, Unitarians, Universalists, Seventh Day Adventists, and some Lutheran and Southern Baptist groups have long opposed
the practice. L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 449 (1967). Within recent
decades, a majority of Protestant churches have opposed Bible reading in the schools. Id.
In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), an Episcopal parishioner unsuccessfully challenged a public school program releasing students for voluntary, off-grounds religion
classes.
12. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
13. Id. at 15-16.
14. The Court upheld the statute as an exercise of the state's authority to ensure the
safety of children en route to and from accredited schools. Id. at 18.
15. Id. at 15.
16. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
17. See L. PFEFFER, supra note 11, at 151-53.
18. Id. (discussing the positions of prominent Catholic and Protestant clergy and
scholars).
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firmed that public schools may not lend their support to religion,
by striking down statutes that authorized daily prayer' 9 and Bible
reading 2° at school. The result of those decisions was to focus debate in the academic community and among the general public on
the appropriate extent of separation. 2 ' Some saw the Court's
"strict separation" of church and state as hostile toward religion. 22
B.

The Secular As Religious

The argument against strict separation assumes that a traditional theistic perspective is embodied in our political institutions
and necessary to their vitality.2 3 Freedom of religion, it is argued,
does not imply "freedom from religion."' 24 The loss of a religious
perspective in government is linked to the breakdown of Christian
morality in society generally. 25 Changes in society-in family
structure, in the roles of the sexes, in the relations between generations-are viewed as reflecting the decreasing importance of religion in people's lives, and the Court's separation decisions as
accelerating this process. 26 The strict separation of government
and religion, or secularization, 2 is seen as replacing traditional
morality with other values, referred to as "secular" because they
do not rely on God or transcendence.28 Some Christians perceive a
comprehensive system of secular values in direct conflict with their
own beliefs. 29 They see these values as akin to another religion,
19. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
20. Abington School Dist. v. Schemmp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
21. See L. PFEFFER, supra note 11, at 466-69, 473-76.
22. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart was among those who saw strict separation
as anti-religious. In his dissent to the 1963 decision on school prayer and Bible reading,
Justice Stewart argued that the prohibition of religious exercises in schools placed religion at a "state-created disadvantage." Schemmp, 374 U.S. at 313 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In consigning religion to private conduct, the Court, he argued, in effect had
established a religion of secularism. Id.
23. See Taylor, supra note 6,at 222.
24. L. PFEFFER, supra note 11, at 466 (emphasis omitted) (attributing the statement
to evangelist Billy Graham); Horn, supra note 3, at 177 (quoting No Law But Our Own
Prepossessions?,34 A.B.A. J.482, 484 (1948)).
25. Whitehead, JudicialSchizophrenia: The Family and Education in a Secular Society, 1982 J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 49, 50, 72-91 (1982) (explaining the role of
Supreme Court decisions in the demise of traditional family values).
26. Id.
27. Secularization refers to the removal of religious doctrine. Thus, "the process of
secularization has been the means of achieving compliance with the establishment
clause." Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1538 n.12 (9th Cir.)
(Canby, J., concurring), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 85 (1985). Secularism, on the other hand,
refers to a "body of anti-religious doctrine." Id.
28. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
29. E.g., Rushdoony, An Historicaland Biblical View of the Family, Church, State,
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which is replacing Christianity as the majority religion of the country, stressing the secular to the exclusion of traditional theism. a
Secular religion, it is argued, does not belong in the schools any
more than prayer or Bible reading; the establishment clause applies
to all religions, not just traditional ones.3 I
Frequently, this "religion" of secular values is referred to as secular humanism. 2 The term "secular humanism" is borrowed from
twentieth century philosophy. 3 It is variously defined, and is
sometimes used interchangeably with "secularism" and "humanism. '"" Authorities agree that secular humanism represents a
modernistic moral perspective that does not rely on a transcendent
being. 5 Members of current humanist organizations disagree with
respect to whether humanism is a religion. 36 The argument that
secular humanism is a religion draws support from modern theologians who suggest that religion includes any belief system that addresses the "ultimate concerns" of individuals, regardless of
whether those concerns are secular in a traditional sense.37 Under
and Education, 1982 J. CHRISTIAN

JURISPRUDENCE

21, 30-31 (1982); Taylor, supra note

6, at 221, 227.

30. Ball, Keynote Address: 1981 Seminar on Church, Family, State, and Education,
1982 J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 11, 14-18 (1982); Taylor, supra note 6, at 221-22.
31. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1315 (1977) (new religions "cannot stand
outside the first amendment merely because they did not exist when the Bill of Rights was
drafted"), aff'd per curiam, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
32. See supra note 6, discussing secular humanism.
33. See Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 961 (S.D. Ala. 1987),
rev'd, No. 87-7216 (11th Cir. Aug. 26, 1987).
34. See id. at 960-65 (summarizing the testimony of philosophy experts).
35. Id. at 961, 964.
36. Id. at 969. In an often cited footnote to a 1961 decision, Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961), the Supreme Court listed Secular Humanism as one of several
non-theistic religions practiced in this country. See Grove, 753 F.2d at 1536-37; Malnak,
592 F.2d at 212 (Adams, J., concurring); Women's Services, P.C. v. Thone, 483 F. Supp.
1022, 1034 (D. Neb. 1979).
37. For a description of modern definitions of religion, by both theologians and
courts, see Malnak, 592 F.2d at 207-10 (Adams, J., concurring); Note, supra note 5, at
144-45; Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056,
1066-1072 (1978). The courts have relied on an encompassing definition of religion
outside of the establishment clause context. For example, they have extended the protection of conscientious objector statutes to those whose pacifistic beliefs would not traditionally qualify as religious. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 341-42
(1970) (plurality opinion) (pacifist exempted from military service though he characterized his beliefs as non-religious); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965) (conscientious objector need not believe in a supreme being as long as his pacifistic beliefs
occupy a place of "ultimate concern" in his life); In re Weitzman, 426 F.2d 439 (8th Cir.
1970) (naturalization applicant granted exemption from oath to bear arms on basis of
pacifism amounting to religious convictions); United States v. Levy, 419 F.2d 360, 368
(8th Cir. 1969) ("Any type of sincerely held belief opposing war" would most likely qualify as a religious exemption). Opponents of secularization argue that if holders of non-
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this rubric, ideas that have no connection with an organized religion could be considered religious.38
"Secular humanism claims" incorporate several interrelated
ideas: 1) the strict separation of government and Christianity represents a hostile attitude toward religion, preferring the interests of
non-believers;39 2) hostility toward traditional theistic teachings
characterizes secular humanism; 4° and 3) certain secular ideas, for
instance the theory of evolution and birth control, may not be promoted by government because they are tenets of the religion of secular humanism.4 ' All of these factors-a breach of neutrality; a
hostile, anti-religious attitude toward traditional faiths; and the
promotion of tenets of secular humanism-are seen as establishing
a state religion of secularism.
Thus, a claim may challenge sponsorship of a particular idea, as,
for example, the claim in Wright v. Houston Independent School
District42 that public schools breached neutrality by teaching
evolution but not creationism. In Crowley v. Smithsonian Institution,4 3 fundamentalist Christians" charged that a museum exhibit
explaining evolution advanced a tenet of secular humanism.45 Alternatively, a claim may challenge the exclusion of theistic religion
from state sponsorship as an unconstitutional preference for the
traditional beliefs are accorded such special protections reserved for religious belief, they
must be willing to accept the "proscription of nonestablishment" as well. See Toscano, A
Dubious Neutrality. The Establishment of Secularism in the Public Schools, 1979 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 177, 204 n.98 (quoting OAKS, Introduction, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH
AND STATE 1, 5 (D. Oaks ed. 1963)).
38. Judge Lay of the Eighth Circuit found religious grounds for pacifism in plaintiff's
reverence for the laws of nature. See In re Weitzman, 426 F.2d 439, 455-57 (8th Cir.
1970).
39. Smith, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala. 1987), rev'd, No. 87-7216 (11th Cir. Aug. 26,
1987); see Jackson v. California, 460 F.2d 282, 283 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1972).
40. See Grove, 753 F.2d at 1535 (Canby, J., concurring); Jackson, 460 F.2d at 283 &
n.l.
41. See Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738, 740 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Civic
Awareness of Am. Ltd. v. Richardson, 343 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
42. 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1209 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
43. 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
44. The term "fundamentalists" usually refers to certain Protestant Christians who
generally oppose modernism and interpret the Bible literally. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 921 (1976). But see Arnold, The Rise of Catholic Fundamentalism, 156 AMERICA 297 (1987) (discussing fundamentalism among Roman
Catholics).
45. See Crowley, 636 F.2d at 740. See also Civic Awareness, 343 F. Supp. 1358 (rejecting a claim that federal support of Planned Parenthood establishes the secular humanistic tenet of abortion rights).
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secular over the religious.46 Thus, the exclusive support of public,
but not religious, schools has been challenged as establishing an
"irreligion" hostile to Christianity.47 The ideas expressed in these
claims are closely connected; they are formulations of a single
idea-that the removal of traditional religion from government establishes a religion of secularism.48 Some plaintiffs, in fact, have
suggested that government achieve neutrality by restoring traditional perspectives alongside the prevalent secular outlook. For example, plaintiffs alleging that the teaching of evolution establishes
secular humanism have proposed that equal time be devoted to
teaching the Biblical version of creation.4 9
Much of the commentary about secular humanism and several
of the claims based on secular humanism theories focus on public
schooling.50 Dissatisfied parents complain that school curricula of46. The Crowley court's explication of the establishment clause seems to allow for
two formulations. Not only may government not advance or support a particular religion, it also must maintain neutrality between religions, and between religion and irreligion. Crowley, 636 F.2d at 743.
47. See Jackson v. California, 460 F.2d 282, 283 n.1 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
48. See Grove, 753 F.2d at 1538 n.12. The plaintiffs in Grove challenged a particular
reading assignment as anti-religious. The concurring opinion noted that "[p]laintiffs' brief
• .. leaves the distinct impression that their objection is ...

to the public school curricu-

lum itself-a curriculum which, as a result of Supreme Court rulings removing inculcation in religious doctrine and dogma from the classroom, they perceive as 'establishing'
secularism." Id.
A case from Alabama illustrates secular humanism claims as a reaction to the separation doctrine. Smith, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala. 1987), rev'd, No. 87-7216 (11th Cir.
Aug. 26, 1987). The case originally entered the court as a challenge to statutes authorizing prayer and a moment-of-silence in school. Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554
F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala.), stay granted, 459 U.S. 1314, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 705
F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983). The district court upheld the statutes, regardless of Supreme
Court precedents dictating otherwise. After a lengthy exegesis on the history of the first
amendment, the court concluded that the establishment clause does not support the separation doctrine. 554 F. Supp. at 1128. Following reversal by the Supreme Court, the
district court realigned the parties sua sponte. Christian parents who had intervened in
the original action to defend prayer in the schools became plaintiffs in a suit to challenge
secular humanism in the schools. By neglecting traditional religion, they argued, the
schools established secular humanistic doctrine. See Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 947.
49. See Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1209, 1211 (S.D.
Tex. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969
(1974).
50. For examples of claims based on secular humanism theories, see Grove, 753 F.2d
1528) (claim that novel used in literature class was anti-religious rejected); Duro v. District Attorney, Second Jud. Dist., 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983) (claim that curriculum
inculcated secular humanism rejected); Wright, 366 F. Supp. 1208 (teaching evolution
held not to establish secular humanism).
For a commentary regarding secular humanism in public schools, see Delconte v.
State: Some Thoughts on Home Education, 64 N.C.L. REV. 1302 (1986); Horn, supra
note 3; McGarry, supra note 5.
For a competing view-that secularization of public schools is both proper and neces-
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fend their religious beliefs." Specifically, they object to the teaching of evolution, which conflicts with a literal reading of the
Biblical account of creation. 2 Similarly, parents object to sex education classes, which allegedly teach children a morality that conflicts with Christian teaching in the home. 53 Other parents view
certain reading assignments as indoctrinating their children in secular humanist ideas including feminism, world government, and
pacifism." Assignments that allegedly communicate anti-religious
sentiments also have been attacked. 5
III.

JUDICIAL RESPONSE

The few courts that have confronted secular humanism claims
have applied a traditional establishment clause analysis. Before
considering the courts' treatment of those claims, a review of practices violating the establishment clause is useful.
A. Defining Establishment
The establishment clause prohibits government sponsorship, financial support, or active involvement in religious activity.5 6 Accordingly, grants of public funds to religious groups generally are
unconstitutional.5 7 The regular, free use of public facilities for religious activities also has been held an unconstitutional use of public
funds. 8
To determine whether an activity represents an establishment of
religion, courts most often use a three-prong test, first enunciated
sary-see Wood, Editorial: The Battle over the Public Schools, 28 J. CHURCH & STATE 5
(1986).
51. See generally Toscano, supra note 37. The same sentiment underlies the argument
that government should support parochial schools. For a description of that position, see
L. PFEFFER, supra note 11, at 521-24.
52. See Wright, 366 F. Supp. at 1209. Debate over the teaching of evolution first
made its way into the courts sixty years ago. See Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W.
363 (1927). For a discussion of evolution and creationism in the classroom, see R.
O'NEIL, CLASSROOMS IN THE CROSSFIRE 88-97 (1981).
53. See Smith v. Ricci, 89 N.J. 514, 446 A.2d 501, 505 (1982).
54. Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986),
rev'd, No. 86-6144 (6th Cir. Aug. 24, 1987).
55. See Grove, 753 F.2d at 153.
56. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
57. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (upholding release of public school
students to attend off-grounds religion classes).
58. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1948).
But see Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980) (public university must grant
religious groups equal access to facilities). Sectarian welfare institutions may qualify for
government funds if they fulfill secular needs. See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291
(1899). See also L. PFEFFER, supra note 11, at 199-205.
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by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.59 Under the Lemon
test, an activity will not violate the establishment clause if it 1) has
a secular purpose, 2) does not have a primary effect of either promoting or inhibiting religion, and 3) does not foster government
entanglement in religious affairs.6" For example, posting the Ten
Commandments in public school classrooms was held unconstitional because it served no secular purpose.6 ' On the other hand, a
statute regulating access to abortions, challenged as an establishment of Roman Catholicism, was upheld because it passed all three
prongs of the test.62
Among activities that courts have held to represent an establishment of religion in public schools are organized prayer,6 3 daily Bible reading,' and religion classes conducted on school grounds by
church personnel.65 A state may not cater to religious belief by
prohibiting the teaching of evolution 66 or mandating equal time for
teaching creationism.67 Curricula may include study of religions
and of the Bible, though, if the material is presented objectively
and not to indoctrinate.68
The Supreme Court has indicated that the establishment clause
not only prohibits government from advancing religion, but also
59. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (state statutes authorizing payment to parochial schools and
their teachers for secular services held unconstitutional because they required continued
state surveillance and therefore fostered entanglement).
60. Id. at 612-13.
61. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam); see also Lanner v. Wimmer,
463 F. Supp. 867 (D. Utah 1978) (religion classes had no secular purpose and involved
entanglement).
62. Women's Services, P.C. v. Thone, 483 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Neb. 1979). For the
history and present status of the Lemon test, see Comment, Establishment Clause Analysis: An Apology for the Lemon test in the Wake of Wallace v. Jaffree, 30 S.D.L. REV. 599
(1985) (arguing that the test remains viable).
63. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1963); Abington School Dist. v. Schemmp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963).
64. Schemmp, 374 U.S. 203.
65. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). A public
school may release students during the day to attend off-grounds religious classes, Zorach, 343 U.S. 306, though it may not award credit for those classes, Lanner, 463 F.
Supp. 867.
66. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
67. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987); Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485
(6th Cir. 1975).
Creationism rejects the theory of evolution, positing that "all change has a purpose and
is preordained by a supernatural creator who produced life, suddenly and in its full complexity, not more than 10,000 years ago." Darwin Go Home, The ECONOMIST, Dec. 13,
1986, at 27.
68. Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133, modified, 474 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Tenn.
1979).
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mandates government neutrality in religious matters. 69 Neutrality
requires that government neither prefer one sect over another nor
show a preference between believers and non-believers.7 0 To avoid
the latter stricture, government must not "affirmatively oppos[e]"
or show hostility toward religion; 7 ' nor may it endorse anti-religious sentiments.72
While many opinions include language to this effect, the neutrality/hostility analysis appears largely in dicta. Cases typically are
decided on other grounds. 3 Thus, the opinions offer little guidance in determining whether government activity might breach
neutrality or constitute hostility toward religion. One court has
held that a university could not deny the use of its buildings to
religious groups while granting access to other student groups.7 4
The university's policy "single[d] out" and "stigmatize[d] certain
religious activity," thereby violating the establishment clause. 75 In
another case, the Supreme Court upheld a public school program
releasing students during the day for off-grounds religious classes,
noting that refusal to accommodate sectarian needs would prefer
non-believers.76
Thus, according to judicial dicta, government activity that is not
itself religious may nonetheless violate the establishment clause if it
is non-neutral, or anti-religious. This principle is recognized in the
second prong of the Lemon test, which prohibits government from
inhibiting, as well as promoting, religion. Some courts have referred to such a violation as an establishment of secularism.77
B. Addressing Secular Humanism Claims
Generally, courts have rejected claims that secular practices establish a religion.78 Courts have approached these claims in various ways.
69. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103-04; Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314.
70. Everson v. of Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314.
71. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104; see also Schemmp, 374 U.S. at 225.
72. See Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1539-40 (9th Cir.)
(Canby, J., concurring), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 85 (1985).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
74. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980).
75. Id.at 1317.
76. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314.
77. See Schemmp, 374 U.S. 203; Crockett v. Sorenson, 568 F. Supp. 1422, 1425
(W.D. Va. 1983) (to "insulate ... public institutions from any mention of God" would
establish secular humanism).
78. See, e.g., Smith v. Board of Comm'rs, No. 87-7216 (1ith Cir. Aug. 26, 1987);
Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir.) (work of fiction not secular humanism), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 85 (1985); Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d
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1. Evolution
Fundamentalist Christians long have argued that government
may not advance the theory of evolution because it contradicts the
Christian explanation of human origins. 79 In Crowley v. Smithsonian Institution,8" fundamentalists unsuccessfully challenged
evolution exhibits at the Smithsonian as promoting a tenet of secular humanism.8" The exhibits depicted the emergence of life forms,
82
including human beings, as a response to environmental factors.
The plaintiffs espoused "scientific creationism," which posits that
God created all life, at one time, in completed form. 83 They alleged that the museum used federal funds to advance a theory that
inhibited the exercise of fundamentalist Christianity and established the religion of secular humanism.84 The plaintiffs requested
either the removal of the evolution exhibits or the commitment of
equal funds to exhibits explaining creationism.85
The plaintiffs in Crowley argued that the theory of evolution is a
religion because it "is not a true science, but is a 'faith position.' "86
They defined religion as "a nonobservable and alleged phenomenon which can neither be proven nor verified by the scientific
method." 87 The court rejected such a definition of religion for first
amendment purposes. 88 Under the plaintiffs' definition, the court
noted, the theory of relativity, for example, would be "religious,"
and "obviously the constitution would not interdict government
development and diffusion of knowledge about relativity .
"...89
Though evolutionary theory could not be proven in the laboratory,
and to that extent rests on faith, it did not qualify as a religion
738 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (evolution exhibits do not establish secular humanism); Jackson v.
California, 460 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (refusal of aid to religious schools
not secular humanism); Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D.
Tex. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969
(1974) (teaching evolution does not establish secular humanism); Civic Awareness of
Am. Ltd. v. Richardson, 343 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (federal funds for family
planning do not establish secular humanism).
79. See supra note 52.
80. 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
81. Id. at 740. The plaintiff-appellants in Crowley were an individual and two organizations, the National Foundation for Fairness in Education and National Bible Knowledge, Inc. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 739.
84. Id. at 740.
85. Id.
86. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting affidavit of plaintiffs' expert witness).
87. Id. at 742.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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under the establishment clause, the court concluded.90
Though recognizing that secular humanism advocates the theory
of evolution, 9 ' the court emphasized that government may adopt a
position that coincides with a tenet of a religion without establishing that religion. 92 In support of this proposition, the court referred to a Supreme Court case upholding the limitation of
Medicaid funding for abortions. In that case, though religious
leaders had vigorously opposed abortion funding, government
could also oppose funding without establishing a religion.93 Similarly, in Crowley, "[tihe fact that appellants were able to identify
one religious group that espoused evolution as one of its tenets
[was] immaterial." 94 The court also noted the absence of a relationship between the defendants and an organized group of secular
humanists as an indication that the exhibits were not religiously
95
motivated.
In conclusion, the Crowley court approved the district court's
application of the Lemon test: the exhibits had a secular purpose,
they neither advanced secular humanism nor hindered the practice
of the plaintiffs' religion, and they did not entangle government
with religion.96 The court held,
therefore, that the exhibits did not
97
humanism.
secular
establish
The discussion of evolution also has been a source of friction in
public schools. In Wright v. Houston IndependentSchool District,98
a court held that teaching the theory of evolution does not establish secular humanism.
The plaintiffs in Wright were students who sought to enjoin a
school district from teaching evolution. They claimed that the uncritical presentation of evolution in the curriculum violated the
principle of neutrality and established a religion of secularism. 99 In
support of their argument, the plaintiffs relied on Epperson v. Ar90. Id.
91. Id. at 740 n.3 ("The record establishes without contradiction that Secular Humanism advocates ... the theory of evolution .....
92. Id. at 742-43.
93. Id. at 743 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)).
94. Crowley, 636 F.2d at 743.
95. Id. at 740 n.3.
96. Id. at 744. In noting that the exhibits did not mention or disparage religion, id. at
741, the court appeared to endorse the view that an affirmatively anti-religious exhibit
would create establishment problems.
97. Id. at 744.
98. 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
99. Id. at 1209.
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kansas,1°° in which the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution. The Court had stated
that the statute attempted to limit classroom discussion of human
origins to one particular theory, the Biblical account of creation.
' 0l
02
test.
neutrality
Thus, the statute in Epperson failed the
The plaintiffs in Wright maintained that the Houston school district, by teaching evolution and not creationism, similarly failed to
remain neutral to religion. 13 The court rejected the analogy.
Whereas Arkansas had imposed a statutory restriction, motivated
by sectarian concerns, the Houston schools merely included the
theory of evolution in the curriculum. The school district espoused
no official position regarding human origins and had not curtailed
free discussion of opposing views. 10
The court also looked for a connection between religion and the
school's approach to the subject of evolution. 10 5 Relying on a
Supreme Court definition of religion as one's view of his relation to
his creator, the court acknowledged a connection, but one too attenuated to support the establishment claim.' 0 6 Though both
evolution and religion are concerned with human origins, the chal10 7
lenged material was "peripheral to the matter of religion.'

Moreover, the Wright court likened the requested injunction to
"book burning."' 1 8 Noting that science and religion necessarily
address many of the same questions, and may often provide different answers, the court warned that public school teachers should
not be expected to avoid discussing "every scientific issue on which
some religion claims expertise."109
As an alternative to enjoining discussion of evolution, the plaintiffs proposed that the schools assume a neutral position by giving
creationism "equal time" in the curriculum." 1 The court found
this solution, though "at first glance ...

reasonable and fair," ulti-

mately unworkable."'I Noting that religions hold distinctive views
100. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
101. Wright, 366 F. Supp. at 1209-10.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1210.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1210 & n.5 (citing Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890)).
107. Wright, 366 F. Supp. at 1210.
108. Id. at 1211.
109. Id. "[A]s the Supreme Court wrote twenty years ago, it is not the business of
government to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine.
Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 .

.

. (1952)."

110. Wright, 366 F. Supp. at 1211.
111. Id.

Id.
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concerning many topics treated in a classroom, 1 2 the court was
not prepared to determine which of those views must be included
in a school curriculum.' 1'
2.

Sexual Behavior

Another area in which religious views frequently conflict with
secular views is human reproduction. In Cornwell v. State Board of
4 students and parents challenged a
Education,"I
board of education5
bylaw providing for sex education classes in public high schools. 11
The plaintiffs charged that the teaching of sex in the schools established religious concepts different from their own. 116 The court
discussed the history of the establishment clause, and concluded
summarily that the statute was simply a public health measure,
with neither a purpose nor a primary effect of promoting religious

doctrine."1 7 The court also stressed that the state need not protect

religions from views distasteful to them. 118
Divergent views regarding reproduction also prompted the claim
in Civic Awareness of America, Ltd. v. Richardson,119 in which a
court held that the use of federal funds for voluntary family planning projects did not establish secular humanism. Characterizing
birth control as a tenet of secular humanism, the plaintiffs alleged
that government support of birth control amounted to an establishment of religion. 120 They further argued that promoting any par12 1
ticular pattern of sexual behavior was per se religious.
The court began its analysis with the principle, also enunciated
in Crowley, 1 2 2 that government activity that merely coincides with
1 23
the tenets of a religion does not thereby promote that religion.
Similarly, the court noted that laws may incidentally aid a religion
without violating the establishment clause. 1 2 4 Thus, the court held
112. Id. at 1211 n.6.
113. Id. at 1211.
114.

314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969), aff'dper curiam, 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), cert.

denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970).
115.

Cornwell, 314 F. Supp. at 341.

116.

Id. at 342.

117. Id. at 344. The "purpose and primary effect" test, enunciated in Abington
School Dist. v. Schemmp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963), is a predecessor of the three-prong
Lemon test.
118. Cornwell, 314 F. Supp. at 344.
119. 343 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
120. Id. at 1360.
121. Id. at 1361.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95.
123. Civic Awareness, 343 F. Supp. at 1360.
124. Id. at 1360-61.

Secular Humanism

1987]

1259

that government may promote birth control whether or not it is a
tenet of secular humanism.
The court also rejected the argument that promoting particular
sexual behavior is per se religious. The court acknowledged that
some activities are "so steeped in religion" that they are per se
religious for establishment clause purposes; beginning the school
day with a Bible reading was cited as such an activity. 125 In contrast, the court concluded that sexual behavior and family planning
are not "so steeped with religious implications as to be virtually
inseparable from religion;"' 26 do not originate in a religion; and are
not limited to religious use. 127 Holding that government funding of
family planning programs does not establish a religion, the court
referred to the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge as "insubstantial
28
and frivolous." 1
3.

Disparagement of Christianity

In the cases discussed above, the plaintiffs applied the "secular
humanism" label to approaches to one of two topics-human origins and human reproduction. In Grove v. Mead School District
No. 354,129 however, the plaintiffs considered the challenged material secular humanistic because of its treatment of Christianity.
Fundamentalist parents alleged that the novel The Learning Tree,
included in a high school literature class, taught anti-Christian values,130 thereby establishing secular humanism.131 The challenged
work depicted the coming of age of a poor black adolescent, 132 including his doubts concerning religion. In a few brief paragraphs,
the appellate court affirmed the district court's denial of the claim,
noting that reading the novel was not a ritual and that comment on
133
religion was not a major part of the book.
Concurring in the opinion, Judge Canby wrote separately to ex125. Id. at 1361.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 85 (1985).
130. Id. at 1539 (Canby, J., concurring).
131. See id. at 1535 (Canby, J., concurring). "Plaintiffs frequently seem to regard
'secular' and 'humanist' as synonyms for 'anti-religious.' " Id. In a footnote to this statement, the concurrence quoted the appellants' brief: "Secular Humanism ...is a religion
dedicated to affirmatively opposing or showing hostility toward Christianity. It has declared its pulpit to be the public school classroom and its 'bible' is adolescent literature
like The Learning Tree." Id. at 1535 n.4.
132. Id. at 1540 (Canby, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 1534.
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plore the "novel problem" posed by the plaintiffs' secular humanism claim.'34 The plaintiffs, he explained, assumed that all "valueladen" thought is either religious or anti-religious, and that "secular" and "anti-religious" are synonymous.' 35 Under the Supreme
Court's establishment decisions, he continued, secular, meaning
non-religious, must be distinguished from anti-religious;' 3 6 the
Lemon test requires that government activity have a secular
purpose.
Judge Canby next addressed the question of whether The Learning Tree represented a religion of secular humanism. He warned
against applying a broad definition of religion in establishment
cases, lest all government programs that further "ultimate concerns" be attacked as religious."'
Even without defining religion, though, Judge Canby could conclude that the assignment of The Learning Tree did not pose an
establishment problem. 38 After demonstrating that the inclusion
of the work violated none of the proscriptions of Lemon, Judge
Canby addressed the claim that the novel was anti-Christian. He
acknowledged that passages in the book cast doubt on fundamentalist doctrine and denigrated the figure of Jesus. 139 Nevertheless,
he asserted that the proper inquiry was not whether The Learning
Tree contained anti-Christian elements, but whether its use in the
curriculum communicated government endorsement of those elements."
Noting that a teacher may assign Paradise Lost, Pilgrim's Progress, or The Divine Comedy without endorsing
Christianity, Judge Canby concluded that assigning The Learning
Tree did not communicate governmental endorsement of the author's or characters' religious views. 4 ' Nor was the plaintiffs'
practice of fundamentalism inhibited by an assignment that merely
posed questions, rather than imposing answers.142 The first
amendment, Judge Canby remarked, protects the former as well as
preventing the latter. 143
134. Id. at 1535 (Canby, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 1535-36 (Canby, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 1536 (Canby, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 1537 (Canby, J., concurring). Judge Canby noted that some commentators have advocated that a narrower definition of religion be applied in establishment
cases than in free exercise cases. Id.
138. See id. at 1537-38 (Canby, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 1541 (Canby, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 1539 (Canby, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 1540 (Canby, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 1541 (Canby, J., concurring).
143. Id.
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Textbooks

In Smith v. Board of Commissioners,'" parents complained that
textbooks both neglected Christianity and inculcated secular
humnistic values. The eleventh circuit held that the forty-four
textbooks banned by the district court did not establish secular
45
humanism. 1

The plaintiffs in Smith were six hundred fundamentalists, representing a class of all theistic parents and teachers in Alabama. 146
They requested removal from the curriculum of texts used in history, social studies, and home economics classes. The home economics texts, they argued, undermined students' religious faith by
promoting tenets of humanistic psychology. 47 The texts emphasized self-actualization, counseling students to rely on their own
experience and feelings when making moral choices. This teaching,
according to plaintiffs, denied the importance of a supreme being
and the existence of absolute values, implicit in theistic faith. 148
The history and social studies texts were faulted for neglecting
the role of religion in American history and culture. Plaintiffs
charged that the books omitted events with religious significance
and treated religion as a purely private matter, in conformity with
149
a secular humanistic view of religion.
The court applied the Lemon test to determine whether the
schools' use of the texts established a religion. Focusing on the
second prong of the test, the court determined that the primary
effect of the texts was neither the promotion of secular humanism
nor the inhibition of plaintiffs' religion. 150
The use of the texts, the court stated, had a primary effect of
conveying information that was neutral with respect to religion.''
Noting that the Supreme Court has not provided a comprehensive
definition of religion for first amendment purposes, the court found
it unnecessary to address the question of whether secular humanism is a religion.' 52 Even assuming secular humanism to be a religion, the textbooks did not impermissibly endorse that religion.
144. No. 87-7216 (11th Cir. Aug. 26, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, US App file).
145. Id.
146. Smith v. Board of Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala. 1987), rev'd, No. 877216 (11th Cir. Aug. 26, 1987).
147. Smith, No. 87-7216.
148. Id.
149. Id.

150.

Id.

151.
152.

Id.
Id.
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Rather, the books had the "entirely appropriate secular effect" of
instilling fundamental values. 5 3 The works conveyed the values of
"independent thought, tolerance of diverse views, self-respect, maturity, self-reliance and logical decision-making.""4' '
The court
found that the books contained ideas consistent with both secular
humanism and theistic religion, but held that "mere consistency"
does not constitute advancement of a religion. 55
The court turned next to the question of whether the texts inhibited plaintiffs' religion. The books were neutral, rather than antagonistic, to theistic belief, the court stated.1 56 Recognizing Supreme
Court dicta proscribing the establishment of secularism, the court
distinguished neutrality from the hostility implied by secularism.
The first amendment mandates separation and neutrality, the court
noted, which do not themselves constitute hostility.' 57 Moreover,
schools cannot refrain from using material that is objectionable to
the "256 separate and substantial religious bodies" in the United
States.' 58
The Smith opinion emphasized that neutrality does not imply
"equal time" for differing religious views. The district court had
suggested that an establishment of secular humanism could be
cured by devoting equal time in a curriculum to theistic beliefs. 5 9
The appellate court noted that this proposal misconceived the relationship between church and state, and the role of public schools.
Public education, the court stressed, by conveying temporal knowledge and maintaining "a strict and lofty neutrality as to religion,"
prepares the individual to choose his religion.16°
Thus, the Smith court held that a school does not establish secular humanism by omitting from its curriculum references to traditional religions. Furthermore, the court recognized that a school
curriculum may teach values which coincide with tenets of secular
humanism and which fundamentalists find offensive, without establishing a religion of secular humanism.' 6 1
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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ANALYSIS

The Secular Is Not Religious for Establishment
Clause Purposes

In traditional establishment cases, doubt seldom arises over
whether the challenged practices or ideas are religious. 62 Debate
focuses, rather, on whether they represent an establishment of religion. 63 But a claim that teaching evolution, for example, establishes a religion requires a court to ask whether the activity itself is
religious.
The word "religion" is defined in many different
162. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) ("There can, of course, be no
doubt that New York's program of daily classroom invocation of God's blessings as prescribed in the Regents' prayer is a religious act."); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 203 (3d
Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring) ("Both the prayer in Engel and the Bible readings in
Schemmp are unquestionably and uncompromisingly Theist. Even under the most narrow and traditional definition of religion, prayers to a Supreme Being and readings from
the Bible would be considered 'religious'.") (holding that teaching transcendental meditation in a public high school establishes the religion called Science of Creative
Intelligence).
163. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schemmp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (striking
school prayer and Bible reading). Often the establishment question is framed in terms of
whether certain Christian practices or teachings serve a religious function in a particular
context. For example, public school students may read the Bible in a history or literature
class, if it is objectively presented. Id. at 225. Even a class devoted to Bible study may be
permissible if it does not indoctrinate. See Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133, 150,
modified, 474 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Tenn. 1970). See generally Sendor, The Role of Religion in the Public School Curriculum, 15 SCH. L. BULL. 1 (1984) (reviewing decisions on
religion classes and concluding that, to avoid establishment problems, the Bible should be
taught like mythology).
One court has ruled that Christmas carols may be sung in a school program because
their purpose is primarily secular. Florey v. Sioux Falls School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 911
(D. S.D. 1979), aff'd, 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980). In Murray v. Curlett, 373 U.S. 203
(1963), the companion case to Schemmp, defendant school authorities argued that morning prayer and Bible reading served a secular rather than a religious function, in that they
promoted moral values and taught literature. L. PFEFFER, supra note 11, at 472. Defendants in Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), argued that they should be allowed to
post the Ten Commandments in classrooms because they are a legal code. Id. at 41.
The issue of whether government activity is religious also has arisen in religious symbol
cases. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680-81 (1984) (approving a city's use of a
nativity scene in a public Christmas display because the cr6che was not religious in that
context).
The court in DeSpain v. Dekalb Community School Dist., 384 F.2d 836 (7th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968), confronted the question of whether kindergarten
children may recite the following verse at snacktime:
We thank you for the flowers so sweet;
We thank you for the food we eat;
We thank you for the birds that sing;
We thank you for everything.
Id. at 837. Reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit held the verse to be a prayer
and therefore an establishment of religion. Id. at 839.
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ways. 164 Whether a practice is deemed religious may depend on
which definition is applied.
That daily prayer or Bible reading is a religious activity is not
generally a controversial proposition. 65 Most likely, one engaged
in either of these activities recognizes that he is practicing religion.
On the other hand, a teacher discussing the theory of evolution or
the novel The Learning Tree 1 66 would probably be surprised to
learn that he is promoting religion. These are not religious exercises in the same sense as reverent prayer, in that the "worshipper"
is unaware that he is worshipping.1 67 Furthermore, whereas the
Bible, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments are commonly associated with Christian doctrine, ideas referred to as secu1 68
lar humanistic are not commonly understood as religious.
Though ideas termed secular humanistic are not religious in any
ordinary sense, they might nonetheless be considered religious
under a sufficiently broad definition of religion.1 69 When deciding
whether a practice is religious, however, courts should consider the
larger inquiry of whether the practice establishes a religion. Any
definition adopted should make sense in the context of the establishment clause. Consider, for example, the allegation in Crowley
v. Smithsonian Institution 170 that museum exhibits explaining the
theory of evolution constituted an establishment of secular humanism.171 The proposed definition of religion did not make sense in
the establishment clause context. 172
Arguments that secular matters are religious are likely to rest on
164. See Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 965-68 (S.D. Ala.
1987) (testimony of plaintiffs' expert witness), rev'd No. 87-7216 (11th Cir. Aug. 26,
1987).
165. "That the reading of the verses of the Bible was religious in nature does not seem
to have been questioned by any of the parties or Justices [in Schemmp, 374 U.S. 203] who
heard the appeal .... " Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
Courts have noted, though, that the Bible may be read as history or literature without
constituting worship. See supra note 145.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 129-43.
167. The court in Malnak, 592 F.2d 197, held that a public high school could not
offer a course in transcendental meditation. Judge Adams, concurring, remarked, "this is
the first appellate court decision, to my knowledge, that has concluded that a set of ideas
constitutes a religion over the objection and protestations of secularity by those espousing
those ideas." Id. at 200 (Adams, J., concurring).
168. Cf Civic Awareness, 343 F. Supp. at 1361 (family planning, unlike the Bible, is
not so steeped in religious implications that it is religious per se).
169. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
170. Crowley, 636 F.2d 738.
171. See id. at 742.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
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a broad definition of religion. 173 Courts should meet such definitions with skepticism, weighing them in terms of their appropriateness for the establishment clause. A definition sufficiently broad to
obscure the distinction between the religious and the secular creates unmanageable practical problems. Under a broad definition,
government programs might be interpreted as advancing religion
because they affect ultimate concerns. 174 While some theologians
may find it useful to define religion as a set of beliefs addressing
ultimate concerns, transporting that definition to the establishment
clause is "simply untenable in an age of such pervasive governmen75
tal activity." 1
The establishment clause cannot realistically imply that government may not support basic values, or prefer one set of values over
another. Those who urge such an inclusive definition of religion
acknowledge the impossible burdens it places on the separation
doctrine. 176 In fact, they advocate the abandonment of strict separation in favor of a neutrality that seeks to accommodate all reli77
gions equally. 1
Another approach to arguing that ideas are religious is connecting them to an organized religion. 78 Critics of secularization argue that secular humanism is such a religion. 1 79 For support, they
point to humanist movements throughout history and existing humanist organizations. 10
Members of a particular religious group may choose to call
themselves Secular Humanists. The existence of that group does
not argue, though, that secular humanism, however defined, is a
173. See e.g., Crowley, 636 F.2d at 742; Women's Services, P.C. v. Thone, 483 F.
Supp. 1022, 1036 (D. Neb. 1979).
174.

See Geraghty, Religion and Irreligion in Public Education: The Growing Contro-

versy, 11 LoY. Q. PUB. ISSUES & L. 57, 58 (1987) (suggesting that governmental efforts to
address the spread of AIDS might be thwarted by an overly broad definition of religion).
175. Grove, 753 F.2d at 1537 (Canby, J., concurring).
176. See Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 3, at 21 (concluding that, because government is based on moral principles, and moral concerns are religious, law is inherently
religious).
177. Crowley, 636 F.2d at 740 (plaintiffs requested equal funding for museum exhibits
explaining evolution and creationism); Wright, 366 F. Supp. 1208 (plaintiffs proposed
that evolution and creationism be given equal time in the classroom).
178. In traditional establishment cases, practices are most often associated with
Christianity.
179. See Grove, 753 F.2d at 1536 (Canby, J., concurring); Civic Awareness, 343 F.
Supp. at 1360.
180. See Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 968-71 (summarizing
testimony leading the court to conclude that secular humanism is an established relgion),
rev'd, No. 87-7216 (11th Cir. Aug. 26, 1987). See text accompanying notes 33-36.
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religion.' 8 ' Several courts have noted that ideas do not establish a
religion simply because they are shared by a particular religious
group. 18 2 Government may engage in activity that is encouraged
by "even the most orthodox of religions" without establishing a
religion. 183 As the court in Civic Awareness noted, the Biblical condemnation of stealing and murder does not make our criminal justice system an establishment of religion. 84 Similarly, an organized
group of secular humanists may espouse feminism or moral relativism, just as Christians may preach brotherly love and obedience to
one's parents; but in neither case are those ideas turned into religious teachings wherever they appear. 8 Moreover, a public
school system that communicates those
values does not thereby
86
run afoul of the establishment clause. 1
The "tenets" argument has been central to the resolution of secular humanism claims. Courts have consistently recognized that
government is not prohibited from advancing an idea that incidentally harmonizes with a tenet of a particular religion. Therefore,
government endorsement of evolution or birth control is not precluded merely because those concepts are important to a group of
religious Secular Humanists. Evolution and birth control are not
simply tenets of secular humanism; one is a scientific theory, and
the other a practice known to mankind for millennia. 8 7 Moreover,
government entities engaged in teaching evolution or funding family planning are not connected even remotely with a religion of
secular humanism. Most likely, the members of local school
boards responsible for public school curricula had never heard of
secular humanism until fundamentalists popularized the term.
Similarly, the overwhelming majority of families who practice
birth control have no connection with a religion of Secular Humanism. Secular ideas such as evolution and birth control find
support among Americans of varied religious faiths, including
181. See Malnak, 592 F.2d at 212 (Adams, J., concurring); cf Crowley, 636 F.2d at
742 (government involvement in a subject important to an organized religion is not support of religion).
182. See, e.g., Grove, 753 F.2d at 1539 (Canby, J., concurring) (citing McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)); Malnak, 592 F.2d at 212 (Adams, J., concurring).
183. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 212 (Adams, J., concurring).
184. Civic Awareness, 343 F. Supp. at 1360-61; Malnak, 592 F.2d at 212 (Adams, J.,
concurring).
185. Cf Malnak, 592 F.2d at 212 (Adams, J., concurring) (pacifism is not religion,
though some pacifists base their opposition to war on religious belief).
186. See id.
187.

J. GORMAN, ABORTION AND THE EARLY CHURCH 14, 19 (1982) (abortion was

a common practice in ancient times).
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traditional ones. I" Thus, secular ideas do not constitute a religion
of secularism. Courts should clarify that the secular humanism of
which fundamentalists complain bears no direct relationship to an
organized group of Secular Humanists. 189
B.

The Secular Is Not Anti-Religious

The charge that a practice is secular humanistic is usually coupled with a claim that it is anti-Christian.' 90 Though courts generally have not relied on the hostility argument to find an
establishment clause violation, judicial discussions of hostility and
neutrality suggest that secular practices could be held unconstitutional without labeling them religious, if they breach the neutrality
mandate. Courts have seldom indicated, though, just what government must do, or refrain from doing, to remain neutral.
Neutrality requires that government activity refrain from showing hostility to religion or establishing an anti-religion. 19' Dicta to
this effect appear in many decisions, 192 but give little guidance to
the meaning of hostility or to specific government actions which
might breach neutrality. Presumably, a public school course devoted solely to disputing the existence of God, for example, would
be hostile to religion. In Grove, Judge Canby suggested that, while
a literature class may include a novel in which the protagonist refers to Jesus Christ as a "poor white trash God" or "a long-legged
white son-of-a-bitch," 193 school officials probably could not read a
resolution to that effect over the public address system .19 But
most claims of hostility do not involve such direct attacks on religion; rather they are leveled at activities that never mention God
or religion, like the teaching of evolution. 195
Hostility becomes an even more troubling concept when applied
to the separation of church and state. In Wright, for example, the
plaintiffs alleged that the schools' presentation of evolution was
hostile to Christianity because the Christian version of creation
was not also taught. A formal presentation of creationism, though,
188. H. GREGORY, THE RELIGIOUS CASE FOR ABORTION 12 (1983) (essays arguing
that abortion is supported by "the Bible, four thousand years of Jewish law, and eighteen
centuries of Catholic tradition").
189. See Grove, 753 F.2d at 1537 (Canby, J., concurring).
190. See, e.g., id. at 1539-40 (Canby, J., concurring); Wright, 366 F. Supp. at 1209.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
192. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Abington School Dist. v.
Schemmp, 374 U.S. at 225 (1963).
193. Grove, 753 F.2d at 1540 (Canby, J., concurring).
194. Id.
195. See Wright, 366 F. Supp. at 1209.
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might itself create an establishment problem. 196 The state must
perform a balancing act to avoid either advancing or discriminating against religion. A clarification of separation is in order.
Claims that government favors the secular over the religious can be
analyzed by addressing the proper scope of separation. If a practice does not violate separation, it may stand; if it does, then government is not hostile in refusing to brook it. 197
Notions of hostility, anti-religion, and neutrality, though frequently mentioned by the courts, remain ill-defined.198 Thus, their
application is unpredictable. Dicta concerning neutrality provide a
sword for those who argue that government must not favor the
secular over the religious. But the province of the state is secular
concerns. 199 The Lemon test recognizes this: under the establishment clause, government activity must have a secular purpose.2"
Government must address secular matters and advance secular
concerns, without facing the dilemma that it thereby establishes a
religion.2"'
The Supreme Court has never held government activity violative
of the establishment clause on the grounds that it was hostile to
religion. If the Court wishes to retain the neutrality/hostility test
as a safeguard against government policies that are truly hostile to
religion, the Court needs to define hostility. This definition must
differentiate between policies that explicitly condemn religion and
legitimate secular activities that incidentally offend religious beliefs. Furthermore, if the Court wishes to maintain the vitality of
the separation doctrine, it must emphasize that separation is not
hostile 2° 2-that government does not manifest hostility in refusing
to promote religion.
Alternatively, the Court could reconsider whether "hostility"
196. Edwards v. Aguillard, No. 85-1513 (U.S. June 19, 1987).
Courts have suggested that a refusal to extend certain benefits to religious organizations would constitute hostility. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76. At some
point, though, an extension of benefits conflicts with the ban on government support of
religion.
197. See Illinois ex reL McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948).
198. See Valauri, 48 U. PITr. L. REV. 83, 86 (1986) (neutrality can be interpreted as
separationist or accommodationist).
199. See L. PFEFFER, supra note 11, discussing secular purposes in the preamble to
the Constitution. See also Wood, supra note 50.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
201. See Wood, supra note 50 (indictment of public education as secular threatens the
schools).
202. In the 1962 decision outlawing school prayer, the Supreme Court noted that
"nothing... could be more wrong" than to regard the decision as hostile toward religion.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433-35 (1962).
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belongs in the establishment clause analysis at all. However hostility is defined, treating it as an establishment issue is troublesome.
Logically, references to hostility appear unrelated to the concept
that government may not establish a religion. The term "establishment" implies an alliance of the state with a particular religion.2 °3
Though that alliance may result in hostility toward other religions,
hostility alone does not show such an alliance. Yet the courts
clearly reiterate that government activity that inhibits religion, establishes anti-religion, or prefers non-believers creates an establishment problem. 2°
V.

CONCLUSION

At the base of secular humanism and neutrality claims is the
complaint that government is disadvantaging a religious group, or
religion generally. Were this disadvantaging brought about by establishment of a majority religion, as some suggest, 215 it would constitute an establishment problem. But government sponsorship of
secular ideas that incidentally conflict with the mandates of a particular faith does not violate the establishment clause. Courts
should rethink the notion that secularism can be "established."
203. See A.C.L.U. v. City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561, 1563 (6th Cir. 1986).
204. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952); Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485, 490-91 (6th Cir. 1975).
References to hostility and neutrality may express the courts' sense that the first
amendment should provide protection against religious persecution, whether that persecution stems from the adoption of a state religion or an official policy of antagonism
toward religion. But state activity that burdens religious practice falls under the free
exercise clause. Government must show a compelling state interest to justify such activity. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
The Supreme Court seemed to suggest an application of the free exercise clause to
hostility arguments in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
That case held unconstitutional a released-time program on school grounds. The Court
noted that government did not show hostility to religion by refusing to disseminate religious doctrines. Id. at 211. "A manifestation of such hostility," it remarked, "would be
at war with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's guaranty of the
free exercise of religion." Id. at 211-12.
If such burdens also implicate the establishment clause, then establishment seems completely to eclipse free exercise; every free exercise claim also becomes an establishment
claim. Riggs, JudicialDoublethink and the Establishment Clause: The Fallacy of Establishment by Inhibition, 18 VAL. U.L. REV. 285, 300 (1984). This redundancy unnecessarily complicates the already confused application of the establishment clause. A. C.L. U. v.
City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561, 1563 (6th Cir. 1986) ("establishment clause has
produced a confusing body of law"). See generally Comment, Of Crosses and Creches.
The Establishment Clause and Publicly Sponsored Displays of Religious Symbols, 35 AM.
U.L. REV. 477, 504-13 (1986) (confusion among courts over appropriate analysis for
reviewing the constitutionality of religious displays).
205. See McGarry, supra note 5, at 2 (secular humanism is dominant in American
public schools).
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Secular humanism arguments are largely arguments against separation. They urge that separation of theistic teachings from government is hostile rather than neutral, promotes anti-religious
attitudes, and establishes a non-theistic majority religion.2 °6
Courts should acknowledge that these arguments attack the separation doctrine. 20 1 At the least, courts should define neutrality and
hostility more precisely to discourage the inference that secular activity is non-neutral or hostile. A more forthright approach to establishment might discard references to neutrality and hostility
altogether.
LINDA EIGNER

206. See Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 3, at 1-2.
207. Whether separation will retain its vitality in Supreme Court decisions is open to
question. Some Justices appear to be rethinking the role of separation in the establishment clause. "[J]udicial responses to the complexities of modem society have transformed the once 'high and impregnable' wall erected between church and state by the first
amendment ... into a 'blurred, indistinct and variable barrier.' " Rhode Island Fed'n of
Teachers, AFL-CIO v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 850, 857 (1st Cir. 1980). See Braveman, The
Establishment Clause and the Course of Religious Neutrality, 45 Md. L. Rev. 352 (1986)
(suggesting that four Justices may support a narrower interpretation of the establishment
clause which would not require strict separation).

